Monday, January 26, 2015

The World’s Monetary Dead End

David Malpass wrote in the WSJ on January 21, 2015:

The European Central Bank embraces quantitative easing despite the sorry track record of ‘helicopter money.’

Central banks in the U.S., Japan and Europe are trapped in a loop. They are fully invested in the theory that zero rates and bond buying are stimulative and add to inflation, yet growth, inflation and median incomes keep going down.
On Thursday the European Central Bank is likely to announce a bond-buying binge that could reach €50 billion ($58 billion) a month, yet many bond yields in Europe are already negative. Buying low-yielding bonds is a dead end for growth. The Bank of Japan has already bought bonds worth more than 50% of its gross domestic product with no growth impact. And ECB bond-buying will be a major new political negative if it gives European governments a further excuse to avoid economic reforms.
Central bankers should be forcefully urging their governments to pursue practical growth-oriented solutions that encourage private investment and hiring. Instead, they’ve allowed the focus to be on them and their decisions to prolong quantitative easing—even though QE hasn’t worked.
Central-bank liabilities have grown by an extraordinary $7 trillion since the 2008 crisis, yet many parts of the world are in or near recession, including Japan, Latin America, Eastern Europe and most of the eurozone. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have just lowered their 2015 global growth forecasts, and the IMF is expected to knock more than $5 trillion off its October estimate of 2015 world GDP due to recent declines in commodities and currencies and the slide toward deflation.
Central bankers apparently believe deflation can still be halted by what Milton Friedman called a “helicopter drop” of money, but it isn’t clear they have the right tools. Bank reserves are already in massive excess. Adding more, as the ECB is expected to do, won’t add growth or stop the price declines because there’s no longer any link from central-bank reserves to private-sector money. To “helicopter” money into private enterprises would require regulators giving a green light to banks to take on more leverage (unlikely given past bank errors) or central banks taking on credit risk, not a wise course.
A better approach would be growth the old-fashioned way through robust after-tax profits at small businesses, investment in startups and more jobs. In most of the developed world, that kind of growth has been on hold, waiting to find a path through regulatory obstacles.
The risk, as inflation rates fall into negative territory, is that central banks will double down on their current set of ineffective policies, making matters worse and allowing recessions and deflation to spread. The U.S. consumer-price index fell 0.4% in December and is on track for another large decline in January. As a result, the Federal Reserve is sending signals that it may delay rate hikes, though six years of near-zero rates haven’t produced satisfactory growth or price stability.
These signals are self-defeating. If the public sees prices declining and senses further delay in interest-rate hikes, why buy a house or business now? The same reluctance to change policy stalled the Fed’s 2013 plan to taper its bond purchases, but when the Fed finally moved forward a year ago, bank lending and growth surged.
Near-zero rates channel credit to the safest borrowers—the government, corporations and the wealthy—at the expense of small savers, small businesses and median incomes. In a market system, credit is allocated based on the price of credit and the riskiness of the borrower.
In our current system, however, the government is setting the price through zero rates and bond buying. It’s also controlling the amount of bank credit through regulatory policy and leverage standards. The result is a channeling of credit to the safest borrowers, which are seldom the best job creators. Even some banks get crowded out because the zero-rate policy has put the interbank market into a deep freeze—there’s less reason for one bank to lend to another with rates this low.
The ECB is facing its own low-rate trap. To make up for antigrowth government policies, the ECB pushed interest rates below zero, creating new problems for growth and lending. It’s now planning to buy low-yielding government bonds, offering the sellers a bank deposit at the ECB that pays a negative interest rate. With bank leverage controlled by regulators, the banks won’t have more assets but simply a different, less growth-oriented mix of assets that includes fewer loans to small businesses and more deposits at the ECB. To fund the Fed’s QE, the U.S. banking system has had to devote nearly 20% of total bank assets to the Fed’s bond purchases, mostly at the expense of other lending.
Forcing Europe’s bank assets to pass through the ECB into government bonds can’t restore Europe’s growth, especially with many bond yields already negative. Observing these problems, Switzerland last week broke its three-year alliance with the eurozone. The Swiss National Ban k had been buying large quantities of euro-denominated assets—stocks, bonds and bills—as needed to keep the Swiss franc linked to the euro. That made sense in 2011-13 when it seemed that Germany and the ECB were working together to promote structural reforms that might repair Europe’s economy and maintain the euro’s value.
But the ECB is now using QE to promote the devaluation of the euro as a way to make up for Europe’s uncompetitive tax and regulatory policies, much like the Bank of Japan has done with the yen without causing growth. Germany’s representatives on the ECB board may vote against the ECB’s bond-buying scheme and have challenged its usefulness, concerns that made Switzerland uncomfortable investing more in the euro.
To his credit, ECB President Mario Draghi has been vocal about the need for governments to reduce both spending and taxes. It would go a long way toward quelling deflation fears and restoring Europe’s growth if he used bond buying to gain structural reforms rather than merely following Japan’s lead into no-growth QE.
Mr. Malpass is president of Encima Global LLC. He served as deputy assistant Treasury secretary in the Reagan administration and deputy assistant secretary of state in the George H.W. Bush administration.

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

'Diversity' in Action'

Thomas Sowell wrote on January 20, 2015 in RealClear Politics:


Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe, and European governments' counter-attacks are more than just a passing news story.
Europe is currently in the process of paying the price for years of importing millions of people from a culture hostile to the fundamental values of Western culture. And this is by no means the last of the installments of that price, to be paid in blood and lives, for smug elites' Utopian self-indulgences in moral preening and gushing with the magic word "diversity."
Generations yet unborn will still be paying the price, whether in large or small installments, depending on how long it takes for the West to jettison Utopianism and come to grips with reality.
Meanwhile, in the United States, no one seems to be drawing any lessons about the dangers of importing millions of people from fundamentally different cultures across our open border. In America, "diversity" has still not yet lost its magical ability to stop thought in its tracks and banish facts into the outer darkness.
Perhaps here, as in Europe, that verbal magic can only be washed away in the blood of innocent victims, many of them yet unborn.
To cross our open border with Mexico, you don't have to be Mexican or even from Central America. You can be from Iran, Syria or other hotbeds of Middle Eastern terrorism.
It is one of the monumental examples of political irresponsibility that the southern border has not been secured during administrations of either party, despite promises and posturing.
Many fine people have come here from Mexico. But, as with any other group, some are just the opposite. With open borders, however, we don't even know how many people who cross that border are Mexican, much less anything more relevant, like their education, diseases, criminal records or terrorist ties.
There are some politicians -- both Democrats and Republicans -- who just want to get the issue behind them, and are prepared to leave the consequences for others to deal with in the future, just as they are leaving a staggering national debt for others to deal with in the future.
These consequences include irreversible changes in the American population. Ethnic "leaders" and welfare state goodies guarantee the fragmentation of the population, with never-ending strife among the fragments. People who enter the country illegally will get, not only equal benefits with the American people who created those benefits, they will get more than many American citizens, thanks to affirmative action.
We cannot simply let in everyone who wants to come to America, or there will be no America to come to. Cultures matter -- and not all cultures are mutually compatible, as Europeans are belatedly learning, the hard way. And "assimilation" is a dirty word to multiculturalists.
State and local officials who blithely violate their oath to uphold the law, and indulge themselves in the moral posturing of declaring their domains to be "sanctuaries" for people who entered the country illegally, are unlikely to reconsider until disastrous consequences become far too big to ignore -- which is to say, until it is too late.
Meanwhile, harsh punishments are reserved for people in business who fail to carry out the law-enforcement duties that elected officials openly declare they are not going to carry out.
To many in the media, the only question seems to be whether we are going to be "mean-spirited" toward people who want to come here -- especially children who were brought here, or sent here, "through no fault of their own."
It is as if those children had some pre-existing right to be in the United States, which they could lose only if they did something bad themselves. But those children had no more right to be here than children in India, Africa or other places with millions of children living in poverty.
Surely we can think ahead enough to realize that children living in this country illegally are going to grow up and have children of their own, with cultures and values of their own -- and ethnic "leaders" to promote discontent and hostility if they don't get as good results as people who have the prevailing American culture, beginning with the English language.
You can't wish that away by saying the magic word "diversity" -- not after we have seen what "diversity" has led to in Europe. 
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Thursday, January 8, 2015

Climate Change’s Instructive Past

 George F. Will Opinion writer January 7 at 8:01 PM wrote in the Washington Post:

We know, because they often say so, that those who think catastrophic global warming is probable and perhaps imminent are exemplary empiricists. They say those who disagree with them are “climate change deniers” disrespectful of science.

Actually, however, something about which everyone can agree is that of course the climate is changing — it always is. And if climate Cassandras are as conscientious as they claim to be about weighing evidence, how do they accommodate historical evidence of enormously consequential episodes of climate change not produced by human activity? Before wagering vast wealth and curtailments of liberty on correcting the climate, two recent books should be considered.

In “The Third Horseman: Climate Change and the Great Famine of the 14th Century,” William Rosen explains how Europe’s “most widespread and destructive famine” was the result of “an almost incomprehensibly complicated mixture of climate, commerce, and conflict, four centuries in gestation.” Early in that century, 10 percent of the population from the Atlantic to the Urals died, partly because of the effect of climate change on “the incredible amalgam of molecules that comprises a few inches of soil that produces the world’s food.”

In the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), from the end of the ninth century to the beginning of the 14th, the Northern Hemisphere was warmer than at any time in the past 8,000 years — for reasons concerning which there is no consensus. Warming increased the amount of arable land — there were vineyards in northern England — leading, Rosen says, to Europe’s “first sustained population increase since the fall of the Roman Empire.” The need for land on which to grow cereals drove deforestation. The MWP population explosion gave rise to towns, textile manufacturing and new wealthy classes.

Then, near the end of the MWP, came the severe winters of 1309-1312, when polar bears could walk from Greenland to Iceland on pack ice. In 1315 there was rain for perhaps 155 consecutive days, washing away topsoil. Upwards of half the arable land in much of Europe was gone; cannibalism arrived as parents ate children. Corpses hanging from gallows were devoured.

Human behavior did not cause this climate change. Instead, climate warming caused behavioral change (10 million mouths to feed became 30 million). Then climate cooling caused social changes (rebelliousness and bellicosity) that amplified the consequences of climate, a pattern repeated four centuries later.

In “Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century,” Geoffrey Parker, a history professor at Ohio State University, explains how a “fatal synergy” between climatological and political factors produced turmoil from Europe to China. What he calls “the placenta of the crisis” of that century included the Little Ice Age (LIA), between the 1640s and the 1690s. Unusual weather, protracted enough to qualify as a change in climate, correlated so strongly with political upheavals as to constitute causation.


Whatever caused the LIA — decreased sunspot activity and increased seismic activity were important factors — it caused, among other horrific things, “stunting” that, Parker says, “reduced the average height of those born in 1675, the ‘year without a summer,’ or during the years of cold and famine in the early 1690s, to only 63 inches: the lowest ever recorded.”

In northerly latitudes, Parker says, each decline of 0.5 degrees Celsius in the mean summer temperature “decreases the number of days on which crops ripen by 10 percent, doubles the risk of a single harvest failure, and increases the risk of a double failure sixfold,” For those farming at least 1,000 feet above sea level, this temperature decline “increases the chance of two consecutive failures a hundredfold.”

The flight from abandoned farms to cities produced the “urban graveyard effect,” crises of disease, nutrition, water, sanitation, housing, fire, crime, abortion, infanticide, marriages forgone and suicide. Given the ubiquity of desperation, it is not surprising that more wars took place during the 17th-century crisis “than in any other era before the Second World War.”

By documenting the appalling consequences of two climate changes, Rosen and Parker validate wariness about behaviors that might cause changes. The last 12 of Parker’s 712 pages of text deliver a scalding exhortation to be alarmed about what he considers preventable global warming. Neither book, however, supports those who believe human behavior is the sovereign or even primary disrupter of climate normality, whatever that might be. With the hands that today’s climate Cassandras are not using to pat themselves on the back for their virtuous empiricism, they should pick up such books.



Monday, December 22, 2014

Fresh Doubt Over the Bailout of A.I.G.

GRETCHEN MORGENSON wrote in the DEC. 20, 2014  New York Times


 “The government is on thin ice and they know it,” a lawyer representing the Federal Reserve Bank of New York wrote in a private email on Sept. 17, 2008, as the federal bailout of the American International Group was being negotiated. “But who’s going to challenge them on this ground?”

Well, as it turned out, Maurice R. Greenberg would.

Mr. Greenberg, the former chief executive of A.I.G. — the insurance company whose failure threatened to bring down much of the global financial system with it — is not the most sympathetic figure. But the lawsuit he has brought on behalf of Starr International, a large stockholder in A.I.G., seeking compensation for shareholder losses during those crucial days of the financial crisis, raises troubling issues.

In a 37-day trial that ended in late November, Starr contended that the government’s actions in the bailout, including its refusal to put some terms of the rescue to a shareholder vote, were an improper taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment. It is seeking at least $25 billion in damages on behalf of A.I.G. shareholders. The judge is expected to rule on the case next year.

Henry M. Paulson Jr., secretary of the Treasury at the time and a former Goldman chief, was instrumental in hiring Mr. Liddy, with help from other current and former Goldman executives.

The government rejected Starr’s accusations, contending that its rescue of A.I.G. kept the company from disaster and that A.I.G.’s board agreed to the bailout terms.

Those backing the government are indignant over the case. A.I.G. shareholders did well in the bailout and should be grateful for it, they say. And all’s well that ends well, right? A.I.G. repaid its $182 billion rescue loan in 2012; the government generated a profit of $22.7 billion on the deal.

To me, however, the case’s significance lies in the information it unearthed about what the government did in the bailout — details it worked hard to keep secret.

And new documents produced after the trial seem to bolster Starr’s case, casting doubt on central testimony by some of the government’s witnesses.

The new elements include emails written by the New York Fed’s lawyers during 2008 and 2009 that had been subject to attorney-client privilege and were not produced during the trial.

Starr’s lawyers argued that the government’s legal team had knowingly waived that privilege when they put the Fed’s lawyers on the stand at trial; the judge agreed and ordered the government to produce 30,000 new documents.

A Dec. 8 court filing made by Starr included emails from this trove.

Some relate to the actions taken by the government to gain control of A.I.G. without receiving approval in a shareholder vote. The vehicle set up by the government to complete the bailout received preferred stock in A.I.G.

The problem the government faced was that Mr. Greenberg, voting his sizable stake, could have thwarted the deal.

At trial, the government argued that it had not tried to circumvent the A.I.G. shareholder vote. But documents from early on in the rescue show the government’s lawyers discussing how to do just that.

“Ideally we should have the pref issued before they realize that we are going to do it w/out a SH vote,” a government lawyer wrote on Sept. 19, 2008. Three days later, a lawyer for the New York Fed wrote, “I would give a lot to find a way to take the stock before the shareholder war machine moves.”

There’s also the matter of whether the New York Fed had legal authority to receive the 80 percent equity stake in A.I.G. in exchange for an initial $85 billion loan. A.I.G. was the only financial company rescued in the 2008 crisis that surrendered equity to the government.

Edward Liddy was named A.I.G.’s chief executive on Sept. 18, 2008, but he remained a Goldman Sachs director until Sept. 23. Credit Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
During the trial, Fed officials contended that they had no doubts about their authority to take shares. But according to the email written by Randall Guynn of Davis Polk & Wardwell, the lawyer who worried about being on thin ice, the Fed knew that it had no “express authority” to acquire an equity interest in A.I.G.

Finally, testimony during the trial shed new light on how Edward Liddy became A.I.G.’s chief executive under the bailout.

Mr. Liddy, a former C.E.O. of Allstate, had been a member of the board of Goldman Sachs since 2003 and head of its audit committee since 2007. He held “a considerable amount of Goldman stock” when the bailout took place, testimony shows.

It was well known before the trial that Henry M. Paulson Jr., a former chief executive at Goldman who was the Treasury secretary at the time, was instrumental in hiring Mr. Liddy for the A.I.G. post. But the extensive involvement by other current and former Goldman executives in his selection was not.

This involvement was remarkable: Goldman, after all, was one of A.I.G.’s largest trading partners and one of the biggest beneficiaries of the insurer’s bailout. Goldman received $13 billion when the New York Fed, under Timothy F. Geithner, paid A.I.G.’s trading partners in full on credit insurance they had bought from it.

According to Mr. Liddy’s testimony, Chris Cole, co-chairman of Goldman’s investment banking unit, was the first to contact him about the A.I.G. job. Mr. Cole was working on a private-sector rescue of A.I.G. and called Mr. Liddy the morning of Sept. 16, 2008.

Later that day, testimony shows, Ken Wilson, Goldman’s former vice chairman and an adviser to Mr. Paulson at the Treasury, repeated the offer to Mr. Liddy. He accepted it. Mr. Paulson then telephoned Mr. Liddy around 3 p.m. to discuss the matter.

That evening, the bailout was completed at the New York Fed.

Early on Sept. 17, Mr. Liddy met with Dan Jester, another former Goldman executive advising Mr. Paulson at the Treasury. A Sept. 17 email from Mr. Cole to a Goldman colleague indicates that he had met with Mr. Liddy for four hours.“Getting him prepped for his first day on the job,” Mr. Cole wrote. “His chin strap is fastened.”

At the trial, Mr. Liddy testified that he didn’t recall meeting with Mr. Cole. A spokesman for Mr. Cole said last week that he declined to comment.

Mr. Liddy was appointed A.I.G.’s chief executive on Sept. 18. But he remained a Goldman director until Sept. 23, and he testified that he attended a Goldman board meeting by telephone on Sept. 21. At that meeting, the company’s directors voted to become a bank holding company to receive additional government support.

Later that evening, Mr. Liddy led an A.I.G. board meeting, notes produced at trial show. He urged the insurer’s directors to accept the government’s costly bailout because it “was not going to come to the aid of other troubled issuers and turmoil was expected,” the notes state.

Last week, Edward Kane, a finance professor at Boston College and an expert on financial regulatory failures, said, “We’ve learned so much from this case that everyone wanted to cover up.” Mr. Kane said that while he is not on Starr’s side in the litigation, the facts that it has surfaced are important for citizens to understand.

“These are the equivalent of storm troopers marching in and throwing their weight around and telling lies about it afterward,” he said. “The lawsuit is an effort to make these people accountable that has not been available through the political system.”

A version of this article appears in print on December 21, 2014, on page BU1 of the New York edition with the headline: Fresh Doubt in the Bailout of A.I.G.. Order Reprints| Today's Paper|Subscribe

Friday, December 12, 2014

Government for the strongest



George F. Will
By George F. Will Opinion writer December 5 Washington Post

Intellectually undemanding progressives, excited by the likes of Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) — advocate of the downtrodden and the Export-Import Bank — have at last noticed something obvious: Big government, which has become gargantuan in response to progressives’ promptings, serves the strong. It is responsive to factions sufficiently sophisticated and moneyed to understand and manipulate its complexity.

Hence Democrats, the principal creators of this complexity, receive more than 70 percent of lawyers’ political contributions. Yet progressives, refusing to see this defect — big government captured by big interests — as systemic, want to make government an ever more muscular engine of regulation and redistribution. Were progressives serious about what used to preoccupy America’s left — entrenched elites, crony capitalism and other impediments to upward mobility — they would study “The New Class Conflict,” by Joel Kotkin, a lifelong Democrat.

The American majority that believes life will be worse for the next few decades — more than double the number who believe things will be better — senses that 95 percent of income gains from 2009-2012 went to the wealthiest 1 percent. This, Kotkin believes, reflects the “growing alliance between the ultra-wealthy and the instruments of state power.” In 2012, Barack Obama carried eight of America’s 10 wealthiest counties.

In the 1880s, Kotkin says, Cornelius Vanderbilt’s railroad revenues were larger than the federal government’s revenues. That was the old economy. This is the new: In 2013, the combined ad revenue of all American newspapers was smaller than Google’s; so was magazine revenue. In 2013, Google’s market capitalization was six times that of GM, but Google had one-fifth as many employees. The fortunes of those Kotkin calls “the new Oligarchs” are based “primarily on the sale of essentially ephemeral goods: media, advertising and entertainment.”

He calls another ascendant group the Clerisy, which is based in academia (where there are many more administrators and staffers than full-time instructors), media, the nonprofit sector and, especially, government: Since 1945, government employment has grown more than twice as fast as America’s population. The Founders worried about government being captured by factions; they did not foresee government becoming society’s most rapacious and overbearing faction.

The Clerisy is, Kotkin says, increasingly uniform in its views, and its power stems from “persuading, instructing and regulating the rest of society.” The Clerisy supplies the administrators of progressivism’s administrative state, the regulators of the majority that needs to be benevolently regulated toward progress.


The Clerisy’s policies include dense urban living as a “sustainable” alternative to suburbia, and serving environmentalism by consuming less. Hence the sluggish growth and job creation since the recession ended in June 2009 — a.k.a. the “new normal” — do not seriously disturb the Clerisy. It preaches what others — including the 43 percent of non-college-educated whites who consider themselves downwardly mobile — are supposed to practice. The result, Kotkin says, is a “more stratified, less permeable social order.” And today’s “plutonomy,” an economy fueled by the spending of the relatively few people who guaranteed that luxury brands did best during the recession.

Michael Bloomberg, an archetypical progressive, enunciated a “ ‘Downton Abbey’ vision of the American future” (Walter Russell Mead’s phrase) for New York. As New York City’s mayor, Bloomberg said: “If we can find a bunch of billionaires around the world to move here, that would be a godsend, because that’s where the revenue comes to take care of everybody else.” Progressive government, not rapid, broad-based economic growth, will “take care of” the dependent majority.

In New York, an incubator of progressivism, Kotkin reports, the “wealthiest 1 percent earn a third of the entire city’s personal income — almost twice the proportion for the rest of the country.” California, a one-party laboratory for progressivism, is home to 111 billionaires and the nation’s highest poverty rate (adjusted for the cost of living). One study shows that young Californians are less likely to become college graduates than their parents were. “The state’s ‘green energy’ initiatives,” Kotkin observes, “supported by most tech and many financial Oligarchs, have raised electricity rates well above the national average, making it difficult for firms in traditional fields like manufacturing, fossil fuels, agriculture or logistics.” California is no longer a destination for what Kotkin calls “aspirational families”: In 2013, he says, Houston had more housing starts than all of California.

In 2010, there were 27 million more Americans than in 2000 — but fewer births, a reflection, surely, of what Kotkin calls “the end of intergenerational optimism.” The political future belongs to those who will displace the progressive Clerisy’s objectives with an agenda of economic growth.


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